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In an acquisitive society, the drive for monopoly advantage is a
very powerful pressuire. Unchecked, it would no doubt patent the
wheel, copyright the alphabet, and register the sun and the moon as
exclusive trade-marks.1
When Ralph Brown published Advertising and the Public Interest in
1948, the law of trade symbols was entirely a creature of the federal general
common law. The new Lanham Trademark Protection Act had taken effect
only months earlier;2 the federal courts' interpretation of the code had yet to
be written. Commercial television was still undergoing beta testing. There
was no Internet-not even in the pages of science fiction.4 Computers
barely existed. The ENIAC had just been built; the UNIVAC was yet to
come.5 In 1948, commercial advertising was entitled to no First
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University. Writing an Essay in tribute to Ralph Brown is
both difficult and painful. Ralph was a mentor, a friend, and an extraordinary influence on my
work. He wrote many things that I admired enough to wish that I had written something that
spoke half so truly or so well. His Advertising and the Public Interest is no exception. Every time
I read it, I find something new that is perfectly phrased and piercingly true.
1. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1206 (1948), reprinted in 108 YALE L.J. 1619, 1659 (1999).
2. Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1994)). The Lanham Act's effective date was July 5, 1947, one year after
enactment. See ch. 540, 60 Stat. at 444.
3. Although a few commercial stations had started broadcasting television signals as early as
1939, and the Federal Communications Commission issued a handful of licenses in 1941, wide
deployment was delayed by World War 11. Ed Sullivan and Milton Berle went on the air in 1948,
but it was not until the early 1950s that communities outside of the largest cities had local
television stations. See ERIK BARNOUW, TUBE OF PLENTY: THE EvOLuTION OF AMERICAN
TELEVISION 89-148 (rev. ed. 1982).
4. Science fiction essentially missed the significance of networked digital technology until
after the early computer networks were up and running. See THOMAS M. DISCH, THE DREAMS
OUR STUFF IS MADE OF 214-16 (1998). Science fiction computers tended to be robots, see id., at
least until the mid-1960s, when novels featuring "The Big Computer" started to appear. See, e.g.,
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, THE MOON Is A HARSH MISTRESS (1966).
5. John W. Mauchly and J. Presper Eckert completed ENIAC in 1946; they went on to build
UNIVAC I in 1951. See 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRiTANNICA 641-42 (1990).
1717
The Yale Law Journal
Amendment protection whatsoever.6 Neither the world of commercial
advertising that matured along with the baby boom generation nor the legal
framework within which kVe would try to constrain it was more than a
possibility. Fifty years later, it seems remarkable how presciently Ralph's
article described the policies and the arguments that would come to
dominate the debate over the law of trade symbols today and how incisively
it appraised them.
The past fifty years have seen fundamental changes in the nature of
advertising and the value our society attaches to it. The legal boundaries of
our protection and regulation of advertising have expanded as it has grown
to be an ever more pervasive feature of our environment. Normative
arguments that may have seemed uncontestable in 1948 appear more
controversial in 1998. It would be surprising if a legal argument framed
fifty years ago remained as persuasive today. But Ralph's analysis seems
even more compelling, now that we have had a chance to see the world of
advertising grow in the intervening years.
In Part I of this Essay, I recount Ralph Brown's justification for the rule
that trade symbols' legal protection should be limited to cases of likely
consumer confision. Broader protection of trade symbols, affording legal
armor to advertising's persuasive function, would yield no benefits to
consumers and would disserve the public interest by shielding firms from
healthy competition. In Part II, I discuss the expansion of trade symbol law
over the past fifty years, as courts and Congress increasingly have
disregarded Ralph's advice. In Part III, I describe shifts in American
culture, legal attitudes, and business practices that accompanied-and to
some degree explain-that doctrinal change. In particular, I point out that
trade symbols have become enormously valuable, outshining in importance
the products they identify. In Part IV, I urge that the independent value of
trade symbols and advertising atmospherics today does not supply reasons
for protecting them under the trademark laws. Rather, as I explain in Part V,
a critical look at the role of advertising in our lives today reaffirms the
importance of Ralph Brown's original prescription: Legal protection for
trade symbols, in the absence of confusion, disserves competition and thus
the consumer. It arrogates to the producer the entire value of cultural icons
that we should more appropriately treat as collectively owned.
I. ADVERTISING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
In Advertising and the Public Interest, Ralph argued that decisions
about what legal protection to afford trade symbols should be driven by an
6. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). For a discussion of the early history of
First Amendment protection of commercial speech, see Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional
Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 CoLuM. L. REv. 720,722-30 (1982).
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analysis of the degree to which advertising itself served the public interest.
The public's chief interest lay in the promotion of competition through
advertising, Ralph insisted, by providing information to potential
consumers about the products they might choose to consume. Where the
law enhanced or protected advertising's informative function, it encouraged
competition and advanced the public interest.7 Of course, advertising was
designed by merchants who used it to do more than just supply useful
information:
Advertising has two main functions, to inform and to persuade.
With qualifications that need not be repeated, persuasive
advertising is, for the community as a whole, just a luxurious
exercise in talking ourselves into spending our incomes. For the
individual firm, however, it is a potent device to distinguish a
product from its competitors, and to create a partial immunity from
the chills and fevers of competition. The result of successful
differentiation is higher prices than would otherwise prevail.8
Advertising, thus, made use of trademarks, trade names, and other trade
symbols combining informational and persuasive elements. Legal
protection of the informational function of trade symbols benefited the
public; legal protection of symbols' persuasive power provided no public
benefit and some detriment in the form of higher prices and diminished
competition.9
Trade symbols in and of themselves were worthless to the public, Ralph
argued; the public's interest inhered in the ability of trade symbols to
inform and to prevent confusion. The law should protect the integrity of
trade symbols in order to prevent consumer confusion or deception; that
would protect the ability of product sellers to supply information through
advertising. The law should not, however, extend additional protection to
trade symbols' persuasive function as well, since that would further
encourage sellers' understandable tendency to use trade symbols to
disadvantage their competitors, with no corresponding public benefit.'0
Additionally, the impulse to select and develop trade symbols with the
greatest possible persuasive function would not require any
encouragement."
Ralph's argument was, as he put it, a "conservative" one: 2 Rather than
proposing a new approach to the law of trade symbols, he articulated an
7. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1186.
8. Ia at 1183.
9. See id. at 1183-84, 1190.
10. See id. at 1190, 1201.
11. See id. at 1177-78.
12. It at 1206.
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inspired rationale for the way that the majority of courts had decided the
cases that had come before them. The common law of unfair competition
protected most trade symbols in most cases from confusing use by
competitors, but it had not gone so far as to accord the owner of a trade
symbol the exclusive right to use it in the course of trade. 3 Courts
interpreting the Lanham Act in the ensuing years drew the same distinction:
Despite language in the statute giving owners of registered trademarks the
"exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the registration," 14 courts
required a showing of likelihood of consumer confusion before finding
infringement under the Act.15 Trademarks, the courts insisted, could not be
owned in gross. 6 Trademarks should not be considered freestanding items
of property, but instead were only symbols, mere repositories of the
goodwill that accumulated around the products that they distinguished. 7
That principle bears repeating: Trademarks could not be owned in
gross. They were appurtenant to the trade in the products they
distinguished. An attempt to transfer or license a mark detached from the
associated product goodwill was not only ineffective, it worked an
abandonment of the mark itself.1" Divorced from the product it
differentiated and that product's goodwill, a trademark was valueless, or, at
least, treated by the trademark law as if it were valueless. 9
That model of trade symbol law, of course, incorporated some premises
about real-world marketplaces that may never have been factually accurate.
Trademarks sometimes do have some intrinsic worth; trademarks often
acquire value that is separate from and independent of the goodwill in the
products they differentiate." The rule may well have been counterintuitive
from the outset,2' but it captured an important principle: Enforceable
trademark rights were limited to rights to protect the identifying,
13. See, e.g., California Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971 (7th Cir.
1947). See generally EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOODWILL, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR TRADING 51-54
(1914) (describing the scope of common-law trademark protection); WILLIAM D. SHOEMAKER,
TRADE-MARKS 8-11, 109-11 (1931) (same).
14. Lanham Act § 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1994).
15. See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959); Hyde Park
Clothes v. Hyde Park Fashions, 204 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1953); S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175
F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949).
16. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); Industrial
Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1937).
17. See, e.g., Prestonettes Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
18. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Grapette Co., 416 F.2d 285 (8th Cir. 1969); Industrial Rayon
Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1937); Uncas Mfg. Co. v. Clark &
Coombs Co., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 683 (D.R.I. 1962); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 755,
756 (1938).
19. See, e.g., Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg., 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901).
20. See Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 762-63 (1990);
Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960,962-63 (1993).
21. See, e.g., United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 95-98.
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informative function that marks performed. Trademark laws did not permit
the mark owner to appropriate a word or symbol from the public domain
and control its further use, but only to prevent his competitors from using a
confusingly similar word or symbol likely to deceive consumers about the
source of the competing products.22 The law of trade symbols sought to
advance the public interest by using the trademark law as a device to
snooker merchants into policing each other's abuses and thus into
protecting consumers from deception?3 It rooted that effort in the principle
that trademark rights were, at bottom, merely rights to act as a surrogate for
consumers' interest, and not rights to be protected from competition.
Ralph's analysis articulated the normative policy underlying those
premises. Black letter law drew the distinctions it did because its purpose
was not the protection of trademark owners, but the promotion of
competition.
II. THE EXPANSION OF TRADE SYMBOL LAW
Fifty years after the publication of Advertising and the Public Interest,
the world of advertising has grown more pervasive and more complex. The
law of trade symbols has evolved along with it. Today, the principle that
trade symbols may not be owned in gross, and that they are protected only
to the extent necessary to prevent consumer confusion, is still good law-
but only barely. It remains the case that trademarks are not property in the
usual sense. Plaintiffs in trademark infringement suits remain obliged to
predicate any recovery on consumer deception. Procter and Gamble's
registered trademark gives it no right to prevent anyone from" discussing
"Tide" the mark, Tide the detergent, or tide, the lunar phenomenon. Procter
and Gamble cannot lawfully sell off the mark without also selling the
product line to which it is attached.24 It cannot license someone-say the
Coca Cola Company-to use the mark to market "Tide" brand soda with
no conditions save the payment of a royalty.' It has no leverage that would
allow it to prevent the appearance of an orange box of Tide in a movie
about people who do laundry, or people who do not, or people who
shoujd. 6 It cannot stop the owners of Surf detergent from airing
commercials claiming that Surf is cheaper than Tide unless those
22. See, e.g., Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 368-69.
23. See Registration of Trade-Marks: Joint Hearings Before the Comms. on Patents, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. 49-52 (1925) (testimony of Edward S. Rogers).
24. Cf. Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 139-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding such an assignment invalid as an assignment in gross).
25. Cf. Yocum v. Covington, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210,215-16 (T.T.A.B. 1982) (holding that
such a license works an abandonment of rights in the mark).
26. Cf. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 306-08 (9th Cir.
1992) (privileging use of mark to refer to product it designates).
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commercials are untrue on their own terms.' It can demand until its
directors are blue in the face that magazines, newspapers and other media
never use the word "tide" without including an r-in-a-circle, but it has no
legal rights that would let it enforce that request. Just as Procter and
Gamble does not own the word "tide," the Coca-Cola Company does not
own the word "coke"; McDonald's does not own the golden arches; Philip
Morris does not own the Marlboro man; and Nike does not own the swoosh.
On the other hand, trademark owners can today enjoin a much more
expansive field of behavior than was common fifty years ago. In 1948,
Ralph complained that courts should view with greater skepticism
advertisers who cast themselves as the public's defenders; entirely too
many merchants had succeeded in extracting broad protection for their trade
symbols by persuading courts to believe themselves bound to protect
fictional consumers who, as a class, were far more gullible, careless, and
easily deceived than the more common, corporeal variety.' Recently, we
have seen a great deal of the extraordinarily gullible consumer. 9 Courts
have been generous in interpreting the scope of confusion from which
today's credulous purchasers must be protected: Not only must they be
shielded from confusion about the source of a product at the point of sale,
they must also be protected from after-market confusion," reverse
confusion,31 subliminal confusion,32 confusion about the possibility of
sponsorship or acquiescence,33 and even confusion about what confusion
the law makes actionable.34
Courts' increased willingness to find an actionable likelihood of
confusion has meant that, as a practical matter, nearly any unauthorized use
of a trade symbol with the potential to undermine the symbol's trademark
distinctiveness may persuade a federal judge to grant an injunction. When a
gay-rights group in New York City fielded a street patrol to prevent
violence against gays, for example, it called its volunteers the "Pink
Panther Patrol." MGM Studios, owner of the "Pink Panther" mark for
movies and licensor of the Pink Panther animated character to promote
Dow Corning insulation, sued the Patrol for trademark infringement. The
27. Cf. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, 59 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1995) (upholding the use
of a competitor's trademark in truthful comparative advertising).
28. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1196-97.
29. See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 463-67
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
30. See, e.g., Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1214-16 (N.D. Ga. 1995);
see also Blockbuster Ent. Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505, 512-13 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(finding initial confusion actionable even though it did not persist at the point of sale).
31. See, e.g., Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 841 F.2d 486,490-91 (2d Cir. 1988).
32. See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, 687 F.2d 563, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1982).
33. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1987); MGM-
Pathe Communications v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
34. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774-75 (8th Cir. 1994).
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court found confusion likely." One would think that very few consumers
would seek out the patrol's services under the illusion that the patrols
emanated from the movie studio. Judge Leval expressed concern, however,
that consumers might believe that the Patrol's use of the "Pink Panther"
name had been licensed or approved by MGM. 6 In another case,
McDonald's persuaded one court that a motel chain's use of "Mc"
threatened confusion.37 Similarly, the comedian Jeff Foxworthy succeeded
with the argument that only he was entitled to use the phrase "You might
be a redneck" on tee-shirts.38 Thus, courts have assisted the owners of both
highly distinctive and less distinctive trade symbols in maintaining
exclusive trade use of their symbols by finding some species of confusion
likely, even where confusion about a product's source seemed
improbable. 9 As the scope of actionable confusion has grown, courts have
struggled to stretch old defenses and articulate new ones to privilege
behavior that, under classic trademark law, posed no meaningful likelihood
of confusion and would not, therefore, have been actionable. 4
Moreover, the last decade has seen the adoption of dilution theory as an
adjunct to federal trademark law. Dilution law protects a trade symbol
against uses that are likely to undermine the symbol's distinctiveness, even
35. See Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. at 874-76.
36. See id. at 875. In Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d 769, a humor magazine was held liable for
running a parody of a Michelob Dry ad, because survey evidence revealed that many readers
believed that the humor magazine could not legally run the parody without Anheuser-Busch's
permission. Their misapprehension about trademark law was therefore likely to lead them to be
confused about whether Anheuser-Busch had approved the parody. See id. at 774-75. Parodists
often fare poorly in trademark cases because of expansive applications of confusion. See, e.g.,
Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 398; Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Pacific Graphics, 776 F.
Supp. 1454, 1462-63 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
37. See Quality Inns Int'l v. McDonalds's Corp., 695 F. Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988); see also E.
& J. Gallo Winery v. Consorzio del Gallo Nero, 782 F. Supp. 457, 471 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(enjoining Italy's Consorzio del Gallo Nero from use of its name on imported chianti bottle neck
seals because any name or mark containing the word "Gallo" on wine products would be likely to
cause confusion).
38. Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, 879 F. Supp. 1200, 1204, 1220 (N.D. Ga. 1995); cf Boston
Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 25, 35 (1st Cir. 1989) (prohibiting sale of tee-shirts
bearing a picture of runners and the legend" 1987 Mamthon/Hopkinton-Boston" without a license
from the Boston Athletic Association, owner of the registered "Boston Marathon" mark).
39. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193-205 (5th Cir. 1998); Pebble
Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1541-42 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, 155 F.3d 526
(5th Cir. 1998); E. & J. Gallo Winery, 782 F. Supp. at 462-68.
40. See, e.g., Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 753-56
(6th Cir. 1998) (finding non-trademark use); Vomado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58
F.3d 1498, 1509-10 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting the use of product configuration where
significant components of invention subject to utility patent); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510, 1530-32 (9th Cir. 1993) (as amended) (permitting the use of functional features);
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, 971 F.2d 302, 307-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (inventing
nominative-fair-use defense); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-1002 (2d Cir. 1989)
(requiring courts to show greater sensitivity to First Amendment values in cases demonstrating
only small likelihood of confusion).
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in the absence of any confusion.41 "The clearest, most candid, and most far
reaching claim on behalf of persuasive values," Ralph wrote,
is summed up in the word dilution. The dilution theory is based on
the fact that the more widely a symbol is used, the less effective it
will be for any one user. The color red, for example, may be more
striking on a package than other colors, but if half the boxes on the
super-market shelf are red, its power is thereby dissipated 42
In 1995, the trademark bar persuaded Congress to enhance the rights of
trademark owners by incorporating a dilution remedy into the federal
trademark statute.43 Trade symbols that qualify under the statute as
"famous" marks no longer need suffer even non-confusing uses of the
same or similar marks when the uses cause dilution of the famous marks'
distinctive quality.'
Courts are still sorting out what federal dilution is supposed to entail.
Some have construed it with breathtaking breadth;45 others have read it
41. Calls to make dilution an actionable wrong as part of the trademark law began in the
1920s. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1192-93; Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the
Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 289-90
(1984); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REv. 813,
825 (1927). These calls seemed at the time to be responding to a significant limitation in causes of
action based on consumer confusion. Courts' construction of the requisite confusion in the early
part of the century was narrow. If products did not compete and were not closely related,
confusion was held to be unlikely as a matter of law. See, e.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney
& Co., 247 F. 407, 409-10 (2d Cir. 1917); Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk
Co., 201 F. 510, 513-15 (7th Cir. 1912). A number of states enacted dilution statutes, but most
courts construed them narrowly. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., 875
F.2d 1026, 1028-31 (2d Cir. 1989); Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc.,
42 N.Y.2d 538, 543-46 (1977). To be protected against dilution, marks were required to be highly
distinctive, see id. ato545, indeed, unique. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1027, 1030-31.
42. Brown, supra note 1, at 1191 (footnotes omitted).
43. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127). The dilution legislation had its modem genesis in a
United States Trademark Association draft of a revised trademark law, many elements of which
were enacted in 1988. See The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review
Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375 (1987); Symposium, Dilution Law: At a Crossroads?, 83 TRADEMARK
REP. 107 (1993).
44. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (1998). See, e.g., Panavision Int'l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1324-27 (9th Cir. 1998). The expansion of federal trademark law to encompass dilution came at
an ironic time: In the absence of any remedy for dilution, federal courts had construed confusion-
based causes of action broadly enough to make dilution remedies superfluous. Even without the
dilution statute, owners of famous trade symbols already had the ability to secure any relief that
dilution would have supplied. Imagine a new entrant to the market-any market-who introduced
a product under the "Orville Reddenbacher" mark. Orville Reddenbacher grass seed, say, or
Orville Reddenbacher gowns. Consumers would indeed be likely to be confused into believing
that the new product was related to the popcorn company, and the new entrant would swiftly be
enjoined. In the current era of corporate product diversification, such confusion would even seem
reasonable. Similarly, Kodak, Coke, and Disney would have no difficulty banishing Kodak
swimming suits, Coca Cola computers, or Mickey Mouse mobile homes.
45. See, e.g., Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324-27; Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282,
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more narrowly.46 The availability of a dilution remedy has enabled owners
of less renowned trade symbols to assert exclusive rights that are
unrestrained by concern for confused consumers and broader than
traditional trademark law would have supported. Today's expansive law of
trade symbols, including both confusion-based remedies predicated on a
loose conception of confusion and dilution remedies for famous marks,
allows the protection of what Ralph called the persuasive function of trade
symbols.47 Most notably, the law now protects the imaginary values painted
by advertising campaigns independent of any features of the products they
advertise.
III. THE NEW POLITICS OF MERCHANDISING
The expansion of the law of trade symbol protection has tracked two
distinct but related trends. First has been an evolution in widely held views
of the public interest. Ralph argued in Advertising and the Public Interest
that just because people paid more for products did not mean there had been
any actual increase in productivity and welfare-rather, we had let
ourselves be talked into paying more money for the same stuff48 That, he
insisted, was obviously in the interest of the producers whose advertising
had persuaded the public to pay a higher price, but was wasteful for the
public at large.49 Today, that once self-evident point is controversial.
Productivity seems to be measured less by what people make than by what
people are inclined to buy. What consumers are willing to pay has become
synonymous with value. Commodification is the preeminent engine of
progress. Transforming ephemeral figments into saleable property is a
patriotic act, and the fact, without more, that an offer to sell something will
find customers is reason enough to sanction its appropriation from the
commons. There has been inexorable pressure to recognize as an axiom the
principle that if something appears to have substantial value to someone,
the law must and should protect it as property. Recent years have seen an
explosion of cases in which courts have relied on trademark-like rubrics to
uphold claims to exclusive rights in names," faces
51 voices,52 gestures,53
305-08 (D.N.J. 1998).
46. See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639, 644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F.
Supp. 605, 613-22 (E.D. Va. 1997).
47. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1180-81.
48. See id. at 1180-83.
49. See id. at 1177-80.
50. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir.
1983).
51. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1198-1201 (S.D.N.Y.
1983).
52. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460,463-64 (9th Cir. 1988).
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phrases,' artistic style,5 5 marketing concepts,-" locations,57 and references. 8
Second, the descriptive proposition that trade symbols have no intrinsic
value has come to seem demonstrably inaccurate. 9 The use of trademarks
on promotional products has evolved from an advertising device for the
underlying product line to an independent justification for bringing a so-
called underlying product to market. Elvis Presley's estate has earned more
annually in license fees than it did in the late singer's most profitable year.'
Warner Brothers has brought out a seemingly endless series of lackluster
Batman sequels. Critics disliked the sequels, and their box office
performances were mediocre, but the sales of Batman toys have more than
made up for it.6" It is hard to maintain a straight face when asserting that the
"Batman" mark has value only as an indicator that Batman-branded
products are licensed by Warner Brothers.62 The worth of such valuable
trade symbols lies less in their designation of product source than in their
power to imbue a product line with desirable atmospherics.
Indeed, in the new orthodoxy, marketing is value. American industry
seems to proceed on the assumption that we can make the consumer richer
simply by revising a product's packaging, without having to make any
changes in the product itself.
Consider the effort and expense that goes into distinguishing a Ford
Taurus from a Mercury Sable and persuading customers to buy one rather
than the other, when, after all, they're essentially the same car.63 Buying a
53. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
54. See, e.g., Carson, 698 F.2d at 836.
55. See Romm Art Creations Ltd. v. Simcha Int'l, 786 F. Supp. 1126, 1134-40 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
56. See Toy Mfrs. of Am. v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
57. See id.; see also Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998)
(protecting the configuration of a golf hole).
58. See White, 971 F.2d at 1399; Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 34-35 (1st
Cir. 1989); Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1975).
59. See, e.g., Kozinski, supra note 20, at 961-62.
60. See AJ. Jacobs, Wanted: Dead orAlive, ENT. WKLY., Aug. 18, 1995, at 26,26.
61. Cf. Andrea Adelson, The Media Business: Advertising, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1997, at D25;
Nancy Hass, Investing It: Marvel Superheroes Take Aim at Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1996, at C4.
62. Cf. Kozinski, supra note 20, at 962-66 (discussing examples of trademarks that become
products completely separate from the goods or services they identify, and noting the
inconsistencies thereby created with traditional trademark law principles). The claymation
California Raisins were developed by the California Raisin Advisory Board (CALRAB) to
promote the sale of raisins from California, but they shortly assumed importance as an
independent product line, without marked effect on the sales of dried fruit. See Michael C.
Tipping, Pirates Taking Slice of Rich 'Raisin' Pie, UPI, Sept. 4, 1988, available in Lxis, Nexis
Library, UPI File (reporting $100 million in sales of raisin merchandise during the two years
following the debut of the California Raisins marketing campaign).
63. See Road Test-Family Sedans: Ford Taurus, CONSUMER REP., Jan. 1996, at 56; Road
Test-Mid-sized Cars: Mercury Sable, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1997, at 50; Cf. Profiles of the 1998
Cars, CONSUMER REP., Apr. 1998 at 30, 35, 51 (describing the Oldsmobile Cutlass as the
"corporate twin" of the Chevrolet Malibu). But see Profiles of the 1997 Cars, CONSUMER REP.,
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truck? Agonize over whether you'd rather drive a Mazda B-Series (Get in.
Be moved.), "the official truck of the AMA Motorcross Nationals," or haul
your friends to the river, kayaks in tow, in a Ford Ranger (Built Tough.
Built To Last.). The only major difference between them is the marketing.'
Auto companies can pitch their vehicles to specialized, niche markets
without needing to redesign anything but the ad campaigns for their cars.6"
But why not? If the illusion of a vehicle custom-built for a particular
sort of buyer is worth a couple of thousand dollars to a couple of million
consumers, the customers will be happier, the auto companies will be
wealthier, and the American economy will keep chugging along, picking up
speed without burning additional coal. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
many consumers don't feel duped, or, in any event, don't mind being
duped. It isn't as if anyone has tried to conceal that the Sable and the
Taurus are twins, that Advil and Motrin and generic ibuprofen are the exact
same stuff, or that the reason that Tylenol and not some other brand of
acetaminophen is "the pain reliever hospitals use most" is that McNeil sets
the hospital price of Tylenol low enough to enable it to make that claim.66
At some level, most consumers know that; most of them have nonetheless
settled on their own favorite advertised brands.
Moreover, there is something more going on than producers and
consumers agreeing with each other to pretend that the atmospherics of
product advertising are somehow reflected in the advertised products. Ask a
child, and he'll persuade you that the difference between a box of Kellogg's
Corn Flakes with a picture of Batman on it and some other box without one
is real. There is nothing imaginary about it. It has nothing to do with the
way the cereal tastes. What kids want isn't a nutritious part of a complete
breakfast; they want Batman to have breakfast with them. One box supplies
that; the other doesn't.
An important premise underlying Ralph's analysis was that trade
symbols themselves had no legitimate intrinsic value except insofar as they
symbolized information about the products they accompanied. As a
normative proposition, that would strike many consumers today as
questionable; as a descriptive one, it is demonstrably untrue. Consumers
Apr. 1997, at 26, 36 ("Oddly, the Sable has a markedly better reliability record than the
Taurus.").
64. See Profiles of the 1998 Cars, supra note 63, at 30 ("The Mazda B-Series pickup is a
rebadged Ford Ranger.").
65. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1173 ("Even if the main drive of advertising is to decrease
competition, what about the frequent fierce rivalry between advertisers? Is that not competition?
Emphatically, it is not, in any economically useful sense of the word. The only kind of
competition contemplated by the major cigarette manufacturers is competition for a higher degree
of monopoly power, for a larger share of a market which is already insulated from the price
competition of non-advertisers." (footnotes omitted)).
66. One cannot get that price in stores. See Julie Dear, Why Hospitals Prefer Tylenol, WASH.
POsT, June 9, 1987, at Z5.
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have come to attach enormous value to trade symbols, and it is no longer
uncommon to see the symbols valued far in excess of the worth of the
underlying products they identify. In a very real sense, trade symbols are
themselves often products: Toys are designed, perfumes are compounded,
and breakfast cereals are devised for no better reason than to serve as a
vehicle for the trade symbol du jour. If we have come to value the
atmospherics embodied in advertising, shouldn't our law be reformed to
protect them from unauthorized imitation?
IV. PROTECTION AND COMPETITION
At first glance, the syllogism seems to pack powerful intuitive appeal.
Ralph's argument relied on the axiom that what he called the persuasive
function of trade symbols was of no value to the public at large; indeed,
from the viewpoint of the public interest, the persuasive value of
advertising was at best irrelevant and at worst pernicious. Affording it
strong legal protection, therefore, seemed perverse. Whether or not that
axiom described the U.S. economy in 1948, it seems naive in 1999. In
today's world, the public has invested considerable spending dollars and a
significant chunk of intangible goodwill in the atmospherics purveyed by
advertisers. If society now values the persuasive function of trade symbols
more than it used to, then perhaps it ought to protect that persuasive
function more powerfully than it used to.
To say that many consumers seem to attach real value to atmospherics,
however, doesn't itself demonstrate that those atmospherics should be
afforded legal protection. Many things have value. As Ralph Brown
reminded us often, the essence of any intellectual property regime is to
divide the valuable stuff subject to private appropriation from the valuable
stuff that, precisely because of its importance, is reserved for public use.6
In the law of trade symbols, for instance, it has long been the rule that
functional product features may not be protected, because they have too
much value, not too little.68 Value, without more, does not tell us whether a
particular item for which protection is sought belongs in the proprietary pile
67. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes
and Variations, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 45, 53, 58-59 (1992); Ralph S. Brown, Design
Protection: An Overview, 34 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1341 (1987) [hereinafter Brown, Design
Protection]; Ralph S. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled
Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579 (1985); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987) (analyzing scope of
trademark rights); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1012-23 (1990)
(discussing copyright public domain). Thus, copyright law leaves ideas, systems, processes, and
facts to the public domain because they are too valuable to consign to private ownership. See id. at
1013-14.
68. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995); Brown, Design
Protection, supra note 67, at 1359-74.
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or the public one.
To agree to treat a class of stuff as intellectual property, we normally
require a showing that, if protection is not extended, bad things will happen
that will outweigh the resulting good things. But it would be difficult to
argue that the persuasive values embodied in trade symbols are likely to
suffer from underprotection. Indeed, the Mattels, Disneys, and Warner
Brothers of the world seem to protect their atmospherics just fine without
legal assistance. Not only can their target audiences tell the difference
between, say, a Barbie doll and some other thirteen-inch fashion doll, but,
regardless of features, they seem well-trained in the art of insisting on the
Mattel product.69 Nor is the phenomenon limited to the junior set. The
popularity of Ralph Lauren's Polo brand shirts or Gucci handbags is an
obvious example.7"
To the extent that consumers want to purchase the higher-priced spread,
they ought to be able to be sure that they are paying the higher price for the
genuine branded article. If the concept of branding is itself legitimate, then
we want to ensure consumers' protection against confusion or deception.
Conventional trademark law does that. But, to stick with Lauren's Polo for
a minute, what about consumers who want to pick up a polo shirt with some
design on the chest at a good price? What if, instead, they want to buy this
month's issue of Polo magazine (which follows the sport, not the
fashion)?7 It seems obvious why Lauren might want to hinder the first and
collect a license fee from the second, so it would hardly be perplexing if his
company threatened to sue.72 There seems, nonetheless, to be no good
reason why we should help him.73
If competition is still the American way of doing business, then before
we give out exclusive control of some coin of competition, we need, or
should need, a justification. Protecting consumers from deception is the
justification most familiar to trademark law, but it does not support
69. For a similar perspective, compare Boldman et al., Doug Is In, DISNEY ADVENTURES,
Feb. 1997, at75.
70. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Left out on the Information Highway, 75 OR. L. REV. 237, 246
(1996).
71. See Tom Scocca, The Mark Is the Beast, BOSTON PHOENIX WKLY. WIRE (July 20, 1998)
<http:llweeklywire.comlwwlO7-20-98/boston_feature_1 .html>.
72. See Mark Babineck, Ralph Lauren's Firm Sues Magazine To Drop Polo Name, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 27, 1998, at C3.
73. To the extent that persuasion is an exercise in exploiting the gullible consumer, there is
little reason why the law should intercede to protect the turf of the exploitative advertiser against
its competitors, who may, after all, turn out to be superior. To the extent that what is going on
partakes less of deception than of producer-consumer collusion, it may well be harmless. If
consumers willingly suspend their disbelief a little because it is pleasant to imagine that eating
Snackwell's cookies will make one thin, that reading Forbes magazine will make one rich, or that
buying the Encarta encyclopedia will make one's children smarter, perhaps it is a cheap way for
folks to get a little of what they want without actually being fooled-or being fooled much. But to
say that it is harmless is one thing; that doesn't, without more, justify affording it legal protection.
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assigning broad rights to prevent competitive or diluting use when no
confusion seems likely.74 Supplying incentives to invest in the item that's
getting the protection is another classic justification for intellectual
property, and it is equally unavailing here. An argument that we would have
an undersupply of good commercials if advertisers were not given plenary
control over the elements in their ads cannot be made with a straight face.
Finally, there is the perennially popular justification of desert.' Producers
have invested in their trade symbols, the argument goes; they have earned
them, so they're entitled to them.76
But so have we. The argument that trade symbols acquire intrinsic
value-apart from their usefulness in designating the source-derives from
consumers' investing those symbols with value for which they are willing
to pay real money. We may want our children to breakfast with Batman. It
may well increase the total utils in our society if every time a guy drinks a
Budweiser or smokes a Camel, he believes he's a stud. We may all be better
off if, each time a woman colors her hair with a L'Oreal product, she
murmurs to herself "and I'm worth it." If that's so, however, Warner
Brothers, Anheuser-Busch, R.J. Reynolds, and L'Oreal can hardly take all
the credit. They built up all that mystique with their customers' money and
active collaboration. If the customers want to move on, to get in bed with
other products that have similar atmospherics, why shouldn't they? It's not
very sporting to try to lock up the atmospherics.
To the extent, moreover, that the impulse to protect something beyond
any prevention of consumer confusion derives from the perception that this
thing has value, that it is something people want to buy, then giving its
purveyor intellectual property protection is the wrong response.77 If the
74. See Landes & Posner, supra note 67, at 300-09.
75. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1200-01; Brown, Design Protection, supra note 67, at 1386-
95; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 166-67 (1992). In the trade symbol context, the desert argument
goes like this: Warner Brothers created Batman-actually, its predecessor in interest, DC Comics,
created Batman, or when you get right down to it, there was this guy named Bob Kane who
created Batman, but he worked for DC Comics, and Warner Brothers bought DC Comics, so in
some metaphysical sense, Warner Brothers represents the creator of Batman. Warner Brothers
sowed, so Warner Brothers should reap.
Warner Brothers, of course, reaps lots-more than $100 million a year even in years with no
Batman movie. See Nancy Hass, Investing It; Marvel Superheros Take Aim at Hollywood, N.Y.
TiMES, July 28, 1996, at C4. Batman will be 60 years old this year, his copyright has another 35
years left to run. (That's 3.5 billion more 1998 dollars.) Warner Brothers's trademark rights in
"Batman," meanwhile, are not time-limited. As far as the law is concerned, they may endure
indefinitely. See generally Phillip Edward Page, Licensing and Merchandising of Characters: Art
Law Topic for AALS 1994, 11 U. MIAMI ENr. & SPORTS L. REV. 421 (1994) (introducing a
symposium exploring trademark law protection of characters after their copyrights expire).
76. See Brown, supra note 1, at 1200.
77. Extending enhanced legal protection to trade symbols imposes significant costs of its
own. If we put to one side the expense involved in judicial resolution of trademark law disputes,
we still need to confront the fact that litigation over trade symbols and advertising can be a
powerful weapon to deploy against a commercial competitor. Wielded with skill, it can
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thing itself is valuable, if it is in some sense itself a product, then we want
other purveyors to compete in offering it to consumers in their own forms
and on their own terms. Competition is, after all, the premise of the system.
Without competition, none of the rest of the rules make any practical sense.
V. RETHINKING THE LAW OF TRADE SYMBOLS
The ascendance of the persuasive power of trade symbols and the
power of atmospherics in advertising may indeed justify a different
approach to the law of trade symbols. There is no particular reason to think,
however, that the reflexive decision to accord more legal protection to any
aspect of advertising with enhanced economic value is the right response.
Instead, an effort to reformulate advertising law to better suit today's
advertising realities requires a critical look at the role advertising plays in
our lives.
One reason that Ralph's premise-that from the public's point of view,
advertising's value lies in its ability to convey information-may seem
quaint today stems in part from the way consumers have come to view
advertising. Advertising is utterly pervasive, and consumers' relation to the
ads they see and hear is complex. Most obviously, to the extent that
advertising seeks to convey bald information, that information is possibly
false and almost certainly slanted in misleading ways.7" It is difficult to
select an antacid or pain reliever on the basis of dueling commercials, each
of which insists that its brand is faster, stronger, and safer than the
competition." Where consumers bring a well-founded skepticism to the
accomplish delay in the introduction of promising new products, the abandonment of effective
advertising campaigns, massive expenditures on legal counsel, and persistent impediments to
securing favorable financing. Where products seem roughly competitive, a little well-placed
litigation can tilt the playing field. That characteristic is hardly unique to trademark law.
Whenever we rely on a private attorney-general mechanism to induce commercial actors to police
one another, we are necessarily inviting them to use the tools we give them for their own purposes
rather than ours. As long as the scope of the public interests constrains their ability to prevail,
however, the risks of the private attorney-general solution seem acceptable. The only payoff to
consumers from enforcing rights in persuasive elements of advertising-in the absence of
confusion-is to enhance producers' incentives to field more persuasive advertising. Meanwhile,
broad protection entails the very real risk that some products and some producers will be knocked
out of the marketplace for no better reason than that a weapon came readily to hand.
78. See, e.g., Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 1997);
Abbott Lab. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 979 F. Supp. 569, 571 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Coors v. Anheuser-
Busch, 802 F. Supp. 965, 968-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Selling It, CONSUMER REPORTS, Apr. 1998, at
91.
79. As this Essay is being written, the producers of Tagamet HB and Pepcid AC are running
commercials insisting on the superiority of one product over the other in preventing heartburn.
The producers of Duracell and Eveready batteries are playing commercials, each of which claims
that its battery will last longer than the other. The purveyors of a variety of herbal remedies from
St. John's wort to ginko biloba have fielded television commercials promising that their
proprietary formulations of herbs will improve memory, temperament, and mental acuity. Warner-
Lambert's commercial for its Quanterra brand of ginko biloba is especially notable-it features an
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advertising they encounter, the information content of an ad is unlikely to
be its most convincing or memorable feature. If an advertisement's claims
are dubious, though, then the purchasing decision had best be made on
some other basis, be that price, pretty packaging, or affecting atmospherics.
Additionally, the pervasiveness of advertising has transformed our
environment. The effluvia of advertising make up an increasingly
significant portion of the landscapes around us and the entities who
populate our world."0 The Budweiser frogs and the Taco Bell Chihuahua
(" Yo quiero Taco Bell") are public figures every bit as ubiquitous in some
circles as Oprah Winfrey, Leonardo DiCaprio, or William Jefferson
Clinton. The Marlboro Man is an instantly recognizable symbol,
embodying both the goodwill of a distinct brand of cigarette and a medley
of associations related to smoking and tobacco.8 1 Trade symbols have
wormed their way into everyday language, precisely as their owners
probably intended.82 As happens with language, speakers and writers have
imbued these trade symbols with connotations distinct from and sometimes
unrelated to their significance as designators of product source.83 Professor
Rochelle Dreyfuss has observed:
Apparently, the graduates of the American educational system are
no longer acquainted with the classic literature that in the past
formed the basis for rhetorical and literary allusion. Betty Crocker
has replaced Hestia in the public consciousness. Accordingly, it is
not surprising that speakers and writers are drawn to those devices
that are, by dint of heavy advertising, doubtlessly universally
familiar.?4
endorsement by Hector Elizondo, who is not a doctor but plays one on TV. See Quanterra, Take
Your "Q" (visited Jan. 17, 1999) <http:lwww.takeyourq.comlsecondary/advertising-index.html>.
80. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual
Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1861 (1991); Naomi Abe
Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 1213, 1213 (1997).
81. The California Department of Health Services exploited these associations by putting up
a series of anti-smoking billboards, featuring cowboys who were unmistakably Marlboro Men
saying things like "Bob, I've got emphysema." See Andrea Adelson, Is Anybody Getting the
Picture?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1997, at Dl.
82. But see Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996)
(involving a suit by Hormel against the Muppets for tarnishment of its "Spain" trademark).
83. Wendy's made the slogan "Where's the beef?" famous. Walter Mondale appropriated it
for his own purposes in the 1984 Presidential campaign. See Greg Farrell, Dancer Fitzgerald
Sample Wendy's, ADVEEK SoUTHWEST, Nov. 9, 1998, at S214. The eight-million-dollar ad
campaign, with the boost it got from Mondale, generated more than 30 million dollars in licensed
"Where's the beef?" merchandise sales. See Sometimes Just a Tag Line, LICENSING LETTER, Apr.
20, 1998, 1998 WL 9856377. George Lucas brought us "Star Wars" the movie and "Star Wars"
the toys, and he brought a trademark infringement suit-unsuccessfully-when the media picked
up the "Star Wars" phrase and used it to denominate President Reagan's proposed Strategic
Defense Initiative. See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 932-33 (D.D.C. 1985).
84. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397,424 (1990).
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"Mickey Mouse," "Twinkies," "Star Wars," and "Spam" are trade
symbols, but they are also now metaphors with meanings their proprietors
would not have chosen. They got that way in spite of any advertising
campaigns because the general public invested them with meaning.'s
The value of persuasive trade symbols, in short, results from mutual
investment by producers and consumers. Nor is it merely the case that a
particular child helps to invest the "Bugs Bunny" mark with meaning and
value when she chooses to brush her teeth with Bugs Bunny toothpaste.
Rather, the simple data point that she wants a picture of Bugs Bunny on her
toothpaste tube has itself become a saleable commodity.
Since Ralph Brown published Advertising and the Public Interest, the
media world has made a crucial transition. The old paradigm was the
delivery of content to consumers. The new paradigm is the delivery of
eyeballs to advertisers. We have become the product.8 6 Packagers amass
information about our characteristics, habits and purchases-where we live,
what we read, what we watch, what we buy-to differentiate better among
eyeballs.8 7 The New York Times Web site funnels targeted advertising to
85. See, e.g., Jere Longman, Corporate Backer Tells LO.C. To Come Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
13, 1999, at D2 (" All this Mickey Mouse stuff about $5,000 payments and escort services, no one
really cares about what it was."); Edward Rothstein, Can Twinkles Think, and Other Ruminations
on the Web as a Garbage Depository, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at D3; see also Michelle
Slatalla, Gingerly, Letting Kids Taste the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1998, at G6 ("Although my
AOL address is just one of four I use regularly ... it receives almost all of my spam."); Garry
Wills, Reagan's Legacy; It's His Party, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, § 6, at 30 ("While we were
imagining our own impossible Star Wars missile defense, we fantasized that they already had
what we could barely imagine.").
86. Feature films are now opportunities for extended ads, and product makers pay dearly for
the privilege of being the candy that ET eats or the sunglasses that the Men in Black wear. See
Stuart Elliott, Advertising: The Spot on the Cutting-Room Floor; Reebok's Suit over 'Jerry
Maguire' Shows Risks of Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at D1; Ruth La Ferla, A
Star Is Worn: For Fashion Designers, the Big Screen Becomes a Celluloid Runway, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 14, 1997, § 9, at 1. For some time, it has been common to use advertising to promote one's
advertising services to potential advertisers. See, e.g., In re Forbes, Inc., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1315, 1315 (T.T.A.B. 1994). Today, there are even commercials to promote advertising to its
prospective targets. Proprietors of advertising-supported home pages on the World Wide Web
have taken to purchasing television and print-media ads to draw viewers to their sites to see the
banner ads displayed there. See Melanie Wells, Net Competitors Take Their Sales Pitch off Line,
USA TODAY, Nov. 20, 1998, at lB. What makes this more remarkable than the familiar ads for
advertiser-supported television or print publications is the nature of the content (or lack thereof) at
the advertised Web sites. Most of them are portals that collect a bunch of hyperlinks leading to
other Web sites that do contain content (and often their own banner ads). Meanwhile, major
players in the mass media, computer software, computer hardware, and consumer electronics
industries are racing to become the entity with control of what the trade press has come to call
"the first screen"-the home page of the combined television, telephone, personal assistant, voice
mail, email, Interet, and home shopping medium that will dominate our future. See Mike
Yamamoto & Brooke Crothers, Tuning in: View to a Kill, CNETNEwS.COM, (visited Nov. 18,
1998) <http:lwwv.news.comlSpecialFeatures/0,5,28533,00.html>.
87. See generally ANNE WELLS BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION? (1994)
(discussing the collection and sale of information about consumers); JOEL REIDENBERG & PAUL
SCHvART'Z, DATA PRIVACY (1995) (examining laws regulating the collection, use, and sale of
personal data).
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subscribers based on their demographics and on what pages of the Times
they look at.88 Type a query into any of the major search engines and see
what banner ads appear. Several companies promise free Internet access
and email accounts to any subscribers who supply detailed demographic
information and then promise to look at the targeted ads that arrive as part
of the free service.89 Data mining-the collection, extraction, correlation,
categorization, and sale of identifying personal data-claims to be a new
engine of breathtaking economic growth. The miners are seeking
intellectual property protection for their collections of information about
whose eyeballs are valuable to whom.9" It is no wonder that advertisers feel
proprietary about our eyeballs. From their viewpoint, those are their
eyeballs. They paid for them.
Of course, I paid for that tube of toothpaste with Bugs Bunny's picture
on it. The value of the "Bugs Bunny" mark reflects my participation (and
that of millions of other consumers) as well as Warner Brothers's. The
building of a brand that becomes its own product is a collaborative
undertaking; the investment of both dollars and imagination flows both
ways. There is no particularly good reason to adopt a rule permitting the
producers of the brands to arrogate all of that collaboratively created value
to themselves. The icons that embody the persuasive force of those brands,
I suggest, should properly be viewed as collectively owned. The public's
use of those icons is no more a case of free riding than is Warner Brothers's
use of the customer base for Batman-branded products to extract a license
fee for Batman's guest appearances on Kellogg's cereal boxes or MCI
phone cards.91
Why then, have we assumed that the owner of a trade symbol should
have exclusive control of its use? Intellectual property rights may be like
88. See The New York Times on the Web: Privacy Information (visited Jan. 18, 1998)
<http://nytimes.consubscribelhelp/privacy.html>.
89. See, e.g, Hotmail (visited Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.hotmail.com>; Welcome to Juno's
Website (visited Nov. 24, 1998) <http://www.juno.com>; Yahoo! (visited Nov. 24, 1998)
<http://wvw.yahoo.com>.
90. See Hearing on H.R. 2652, The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998) (statement of Robert E. Aber, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Nasdaq), available
in 1998 WL 8992218.
91. See Melissa Levy, Marketing: Muscular Effort Made To Market 'Hercules,'
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 25, 1997, at 1D (describing merchandising tie-ins related to
Disney's Hercules, Warner Brothers's Batman and Robin, and Universal Studio's The Lost
World: Jurassic Park). Warner Brothers's Batman and Bugs Bunny are protected by the copyright
laws as well as by the trademark laws. There may be a variety of policy reasons for allowing
Warner Brothers to use licensing to exploit its copyright interests, subject to the limitations
incorporated in the copyright law. See generally 1994 AALS Symposium, Licensing and
Merchandising of Characters, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 421 (1994) (exploring the
legal protection of characters after their copyrights expire). My argument here is that the
trademark law and the policies underlying it do not themselves support Warner Brothers in a
claim to exercise plenary control over its trade symbols.
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money: The more one has, the more one craves, and the more one comes to
believe that one is entitled to. From expanding the ambit of a producer's
interest in a trade symbol beyond the ability to prevent even a broadly
construed likelihood of confusion to the right to prevent dilution, it is not a
very large step for the producer to assert that it owns the symbol for all
purposes. And, if we begin with the assumption that someone must own the
symbol, it is easy to focus on the producer as if it were the sole creator of a
trade symbol's goodwill, simply because only the producer is uniquely
identifiable. The American system has little tolerance for the collective
ownership of property.9'
But who said that we should treat it as anyone's property? If what we
are trying to accomplish is the promotion of competition, classic trademark
rules remain well-suited to that goal. Protecting the nondeceptive,
informative, and source-designating functions of trade symbols assures that
buyers who are persuaded by advertising that they want products of a
particular brand can be confident that they are buying them. In addition, the
purveyors of that advertising will be sure that the customers they persuade
to seek out their product will not be deceived into buying some competing
brand. They are entitled to no more than that. While there is nothing wrong
with encouraging Warner Brothers to sell the public on atmospherics and to
devise clever ways to exploit those atmospherics commercially, neither
incentive theory nor moral desert offers a reason to protect them from
competition.
Ralph Brown reminded us that, in devising the rules of trade symbol
law, we need to keep our eyes, first and foremost, on competition. The
enforcement of trade symbol rights is not costless. 93 As the realm of
protection expands, it necessarily does so at the expense of competition.
Competition, though, is the basis for the rationale underlying any protection
of trade symbols. If we do not want to encourage producers of different
products to compete with one another for consumers' dollars, then we do
not really need to protect trade symbols at all.
92. The American predilection for concentrating property rights in as few hands as possible
has recently inspired scholars to write about the problems arising from the "anti-commons." See,
e.g., Keith Aold, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave)
New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 INDIANA J. GLOBAL L.
STUD. 11 (1998); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: Property in Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998).
93. See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en banc); Carter, supra note 20,
at 760, 795-99; Kozinski, supra note 20, at 969-7 1; supra note 77.
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